Practical In Flight Risk Management
By Michael Leighton
Recently I have read a series of articles in various Aviation magazines on the subject of risk management as it applies to the non-commercial (read private) general aviation pilot. To the average pilot / aircraft owner, it might sound like we as aviators have a new problem to deal with.
One article talked at length about how we must change the fight training system in this country to incorporate scenario based training as opposed to maneuver based training in order to instill “higher order pilot skills” and furthermore, teach “mitigation of risk”.
Another article cites the poor fatal accident rate and places the blame for this squarely on the shoulders of the flight instructors. That story went on to say that regulatory reforms to biannual flight reviews for existing pilots are required because “they don’t know what they don’t know” and the current system is “broken”.
I don’t know about you, but what is now being called “risk management” we use to call aeronautical decision making. I learned to fly in 1980 and scenario based training along with maneuver/performance based training was provided then, and ever since. Scenario based training is not something new. When you’re instructor closes the throttle and says “Simulated engine failure. What are you going to do now?” That’s scenario based training.
What they refer to as “higher order pilot skills” I call that experience. While I firmly believe that experience is what you get when you don’t get what you want, it isn’t something you can just teach. While it is true that many of us fly in “our comfort zone” and rarely venture beyond it, that doesn’t mean that if you do so, you become an accident waiting to happen.
But my real issue with these articles is premise that somehow, general aviation, and specifically non-commercial general aviation, exhibits an unacceptably high fatal accident rate.
I sight the 2010 Nall report, because it is an irrefutable source of facts on this subject.(Published by AOPA Safety Foundation and available online in PDF format).
Non-commercial general aviation pilots have maintained an approximate 1.3 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hour rate for more than ten years. In 2009, Nall reports that 10% of the fatal accidents were caused by mechanical problems with the aircraft, and another 27 % caused by other or unknown causes not directly attributable to the pilot. That’s 37%. So if every pilot was perfect, the fatal accident rate would drop to approximately 0.48 /100,000 flight hours. That is remarkably close to the commercial general aviation fatal accident rate, but more on that later.
Further, fully 64% of the fatal accidents occur in fixed gear piston singles, followed by 26% for retractable pistons singles. Multi engine piston aircraft represented 9% of the fatal accidents. Much of this reflects the composition of the G.A. fleet. There are more fixed gear singles so there are more accidents in fixed gear singles.
The same conclusion can be drawn regarding weather conditions that the fatal accidents occur in. What is more telling is the percentage of accidents vs. the percentage of those accidents which are fatal under different flight conditions. 81% of the accidents that occur in day IMC and 75% of the accidents that occur in night IMC are fatal.
Why is any of this relevant?
My argument is this; there will always be some fatal accidents because we don’t live in a perfect world, machines and equipment and people do fail. I suspect that as a group we are at or near the mean low average for fatal accidents and little will change that.
However, as an aircraft owner and flight instructor I always see some room for improvement.
Statistically, the single greatest fatal accident scenario is continued VFR into IMC. It has been since I began flying in 1980 and it remains so. It is essential that the pilot can fly the aircraft without the assistance of all of the advanced technology. Plan “B” must always be FLY THE AIRPLANE. Recognizing the threat is wonderful, but if a pilot can’t maintain directional control of the aircraft by reference to basic flight instruments then there can be no improvement in the accident rate. This is maneuver based training.
One would think that the influx of technically advanced aircraft into the fleet, sporting glass panels and superior autopilots would reduce the accident rate. But that has turned out not to be the case. Over reliance on the technology is just as lethal as not having it in the first place.
Probably the best dollars spent by any pilot toward reducing in flight risk is to get an instrument rating. If you are an owner, the expense to obtain an instrument rating is reduced to the cost of fuel and an instructor. In my opinion, the instrument rating is the most difficult rating to obtain because you must learn an entirely new skill set. Still, the statistics prove the effort is worth it. But it doesn’t end there. The same statistics show that the lethality of accidents that occur in instrument conditions are in excess of 80%. So one must consider flying in hard actual IMC the aeronautical equivalent of working without a net. It demands that you remain current and competent. Again, if you are an owner, it comes down to fuel and an instructor.
I have several instrument rated clients whom I fly with every six months or so. It is their way of being prepared in the event they actually have to use their rating. More than a few times I’ve gotten the phone call telling me about an approach to minimums that they didn’t see coming but completed successfully. You only have to do it once to fully realize the value of all the work.
But there is another major contributing factor to the fatal accident rate. To understand this, one must look at the total owner / pilot population and some anecdotal evidence.
I researched several fatal accident reports in the last 12 months. Two of them make my point. The first was an 8,000 ATP rated pilot who flew from Michigan to Pennsylvania in marginal weather in a C-172 to pick up a friend. His transponder was inop., so he elected to turn it off and fly the trip VFR, talking to no one. He arrived, at night at his airport of intended landing which was not served by an instrument approach. He hit a mountaintop in the dark and perished. He overflew two airports within ten miles of his destination that had instrument approaches.
The second was featured right in the 2010 Nall report. It was the story of a 23,000 hour ATP who ran his piston twin out of fuel and perished.
Now I submit that there is just no cure for stupid and no amount of scenario based training or risk management training is going to change that. These pilots clearly understood the risks they were taking and they did it anyway.
Let me share one more story. I fly a PC-12 with a couple of guys who learned to fly about 3 years ago in a Cirrus. They routinely fly into and out of a 1,600 foot dirt strip, located on an island, often at gross weight. They did it in the Cirrus, and now in the PC-12. These are smart guys. They understand the risk. They do it anyway. We got into a discussion one day about the Cirrus and ditching in the ocean. The question was, if you had to ditch a Cirrus in the ocean, would you pull the parachute or ditch conventionally. I said neither. I would not be beyond power off gliding distance from land in a Cirrus. That’s why I own a twin. If I needed to do it in a single (and I have), then I would climb to power off gliding distance. They understood the argument but they do it anyway and they never climb to power off gliding distance. No amount of training is going to fix that.
Now, as for “mitigating risk”; the commercial general aviation fatal accident rate is about 1/3 that of non-commercial operations. Some simple things we can do to help reduce the fatal accident rate would be to adopt some of the operating practices that the commercial operators must use.
For example, in the commercial world we must have 1 mile visibility for takeoff vs. zero / zero for part 91. Commercial operators can’t take off if the ceiling is lower than the lowest minimum for an approach to the departing airport without a departure alternate. In our company charter ops manual, we ban circling approaches in real IMC with passengers on board, and ban them for crew only operations at night. Circling approaches represent a real risk. Even though we are trained to do them and required to demonstrate them on a check ride, I submit the risk isn’t worth it. Statistics support that.
For multi-engine operators, a commercial operator can’t go to or depart from an airport that doesn’t have accelerate stop or accelerate go distances. And most importantly, commercial operators must take a check ride every six months. Let’s be frank, there is a big difference between being current and being competent.
Many of us operate single engine at night. I point out we are the only country on earth that permits this VFR, but there are things you can do to reduce risk while operating VFR at night. First, pick a route that passes over as many airports as possible. Second, fly as high as the ceiling will allow and third, use the pilot controlled lighting feature at most airports to turn the lights on as you go so if you need to find the airport in a hurry, you can. Fourth, use flight following. Having someone to talk to in a hurry if thing go badly could save your life. You may still crash, but it would be nice to know help is coming and you aren’t going to spend the night pinned in the aircraft while possibly hurt or injured. If you are capable of filing IFR, I advocate doing so, even on a clear night.
General Aviation has done well over the last 10 years mitigating fuel related accidents. The Nall report shows a steady decline in fuel management related accidents since 2000. Still, in my world, if I might arrive at my destination airport with less than 1 hour of fuel in the tank, I advocate landing and fueling.
Maintenance is always a hot topic. An expensive shop doesn’t necessarily guarantee good maintenance. I have written extensively on this before. (See Cheap Maintenance, can you afford it?). But if you are using the guy who advertises the $300 annual inspection, you are one of those guys who understand the risks but do it anyway. We all love our airplanes, but the fact is if you can’t afford to maintain the plane properly, maybe you should consider finding a partner or selling it.
I do agree with some of the points in the articles I have read. I would like to see some better guidance for Biannual Flight Reviews. One hour of ground and one hour of flight is pretty vague. As an instructor I want to feel that my student walks away from a BFR feeling like he or she got something more than two more years out of it. My BFR’s run a little longer than two hours and if I don’t think the student is safe, I will tell him or her so. To that end, I come to point two. I feel the FIRC, the flight instructor refresher course, which is the vehicle that many instructors use to maintain their CFI currency, should be amended to include a couple of hours of flight with a current / senior instructor like a Chief Pilot or Assistant Chief Pilot of a part 141 school. I say this because many CFI’s are part timers and just can’t keep their skill set sharp in the 50 or 100 hours of flight time they get every year. It just seems logical to me that better instructors make better pilots.
Technology is part of the solution. If you haven’t gotten satellite weather in your aircraft you need to consider it. The prices have gotten reasonable and the benefits are obvious. Considering the majority of the fatal accidents are weather related, it’s hard to not want to avail yourself to that. I fly all year round in Florida where, if you don’t like the weather, just wait a minute. I live by satellite weather. To be able to know the wind and weather conditions, TFR’s Sigmets and Airmets storm cell movement and field conditions far from your destination airport can only be considered a strategic advantage. The fact that most of the portable GPS navigators that get weather run on batteries and will take you home even if you have a total failure of your aircrafts primary electrical system is an added bonus. I just read about an ADS-B receiver that plays on an iPad and gets weather and traffic at no monthly subscription cost. That’s the nex-gen air traffic system coming at you. If you live in an area that has good ADS-B coverage, you might want to look into that. Those of us still flying in 2020 must have it.
Doing any or all of this helps reduce your in flight risk incrementally and adds utility to your aircraft. Thinking about how to incorporate it into every flight is the first step toward meaningful in flight risk management. After all, the object of the game is to have an uneventful flight.
Michael Leighton is a 7,000+ two time and current Master CFIIMEI-ATP, as well as an A&P. He operates an aircraft management, maintenance and insurance accepted flight training services company as well as a part 135 aircraft charter company located in South Florida. You can reach him via e-mail at av8tor0414@aol.com, or find him on the web at http://web.mac.com/mkleighton